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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs 
LYNDA M. KOZLOWICZ, 
Defendant/Appellant 
• Case No. 950461-CA 
• Priority Classification 2 
» (Defendant not incarcerated) 
JURISDICTION 
Linda M. Kozlowicz was convicted by her own plea of No Contest 
of the amended charge of Attempted Failure to Respond to Officer's 
Signal to Stop, a Class A Misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-
3(2) (f) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows: 
1. Following the United States Supreme Court decision in Haaen 
V Utah/ 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994), does the State of Utah have criminal 
jurisdiction to arrest and prosecute an Indian who committed a crime 
on homesteaded lands within the area encompassed by what the Federal 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. state of Utah 
773 F.2d 1087 (1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 US 994 (1986) had 
determined to be the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray 
Indian Reservation? 
2. Following H&gen, does the State of Utah have authority to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians on homesteaded lands 
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within the highway easement of State Highway 40, within Roosevelt 
City, Utah? 
Deciding the above questions in the affirmative, the Trial 
Court did take jurisdiction, accepted defendant's plea of "No 
Contest", subject to her right to appeal jurisdiction on stipulated 
facts. The issue of the State's jurisdiction over defendant being 
a question of law, the Court in this case should apply the 
correction of error standard. Berube v Fashion Centre. Ltd. 771 
P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989); Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199-
200 (Utah 1991)(per curium). 
PBTERMIN&TIVS STATUTES 
18 U.S.C., Section 1151, Indian Country Defined 
Except as otherwise provided in Sections 1154 and 1156 of 
this title, the term "Indian country", as used in this 
chapter (18 U.S.C. Sections 1151 et seg. ), means (a) all 
land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, not-
withstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including 
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all 
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the 
United States whether within the original or subsequently 
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without 
the limits of a State, and (c) all Indian allotments, the 
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A) NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This case is submitted on stipulated facts. (See Addendum - 3, 
pp. 2,6) On November 10, 1994, on State Highway 40 (200 North 
street), in Roosevelt, Utah, the defendant, Lynda M. Kozlowicz, 
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received a visual and audible signal from a Roosevelt City Police 
Officer to bring her vehicle to a stop. While she saw and heard the 
signal to stop, she did not believe that the officer had 
jurisdiction to require her to stop because she was and is an 
enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe, so the defendant continued 
to drive east on Highway 40. The Roosevelt City Police Officer 
finally forced the defendant to stop about 1.2 miles east of 
Roosevelt, still on Highway 40. The defendant was arrested and 
charged with the crimes of Speeding, a Class C Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Section 41-6-46 UCA (1953), as amended, and Failure to 
Respond to Officer's Signal to stop, a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Section 41-6-13.5 UCA (1953), as amended. 
B) COURSE QF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged by Information (see Addendum 1) in the 
Eighth District Court of the State of Utah, Duchesne County, 
Roosevelt Department, with the crimes of Speeding, a Class C 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-46 UCA (1953) as amended 
and Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to stop, a Third Degree 
Felony, in violation of Section 41-6-13.5 UCA (1953) as amended. 
The defendant was originally represented by Attorney Manny Garcia, 
and preliminary hearing was waved. Mr. Garcia later obtained the 
Court's permission to withdraw from the case. Thereafter, the 
defendant, Lynda Kozlowicz, represented herself pro se. Before 
trial, the Court appointed first attorney Joel Berrett, and 
thereafter, attorney Eugene Austin, to assist her in the proceedings 
below. A plea agreement was arrived at, pursuant to which an 
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amended information charging Attempted Failure to Respond to an 
Officer's Signal to Stop, a Class A Misdemeanor, was filed and the 
defendant entered her plea of "No Contest" thereto, subject to her 
right to appeal the lower Court's determination (which it made after 
hearing on her motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction) that the 
Court had jurisdiction in this matter. An agreed Statement of 
Stipulated Facts, for purposes of appeal, was also entered into in 
connection with the defendant's plea. (See Addendum 3, Affidavit of 
Defendant in Advance of No-Contest Plea, p. 6). 
PISPQSITIQN IN TRIAL CQURT 
The Trial Court rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction , accepted her plea of "No Contest" to the 
amended charge, and pronounced judgement on her, with the 
understanding that she retained her right to appeal the jurisdiction 
of the Court. (See Addendum 4, Judgement and Order) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The relevant conduct constituting this crime occurred within 
Roosevelt City and continued on or along State Highway 40 (S.R. 40) 
about 1.2 miles east of town, all on homesteaded lands. This area 
is within the area encompassed by what the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah 773 F.2d 1087 (1985) (en 
banc), cert, denied, 479 US 994 (1986) had determined to be the 
exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation. 
However, the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Hagen 
v. Utah 114 S.Ct. 958 (1994), determined that the Uintah and Ouray 
Indian Reservation had been diminished by Congress. While the full 
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effect and extent of the Hagen decision remains disputed, the 
clearest effect of that decision is that homesteaded lands have been 
removed from "Indian country" status and are now subject to State 
jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN HAGEN V. UTAH (1994) 
DETERMINED UTE INDIAN RESERVATION HAD BEEN DIMINISHED. 
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit ruled that the original exterior boundaries of the Uintah 
Reservation and the related Uncompagree Reservation in the Uintah 
Basin of the State of Utah remained largely unchanged for 
jurisdictional purposes. Ute Indian Tribe yt State of Utah/ 773 F. 
2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 479 U.S. 994 (1986). 
In 1992, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in two criminal cases 
that the original boundaries of the Uintah Reservation had been 
diminished when Congress opened the Reservation to non-Indian 
settlement in the early 1900's. State v. Haaen, 858 P.2d 925(Utah 
1992); State V, Perank, 858P.2d 927(Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme 
Court held that the State of Utah had properly asserted criminal 
jurisdiction over the Indian defendants because the situs of their 
crimes, although within the original exterior boundaries of the 
reservation, was outside ''Indian Country" as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
Section 1151. 
The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to 
resolve the direct conflict between the decision of the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Trihg and of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Hagen and Perank. In Haaen v. Utah. U.S. , 114 
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S.Ct. 958 (1994), the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision, holding that the Uintah Indian Reservation 
had been diminished by Congress. 
Pursuant to the original Federal District Court decision in Ute 
Indian Tribe v State of Utah 521 F.Supp. 1072, 1157 (D.Utah 1981), 
which left open possible injunctive relief against the State and 
local governments from interfering with the jurisdiction of the Ute 
Indian Tribe; the Ute Indian Tribe, the State of Utah, and the 
counties of Duchesne and Uintah and the cities of Roosevelt and 
Duchesne are presently before the U.S. District Court, Central 
Division, Judge Bruce S. Jenkins presiding, where the full extent 
and effect of the Hagen decision is at issue (See Pre-trial Order 
Concerning "Indian Country" Issues, attached hereto as Addendum 5). 
POINT II: HOMESTEADED LANDS CLEARLY REMOVED FROM "INDIAN COUNTRY'' 
STATUS 
It is the position of the State of Utah, Duchesne County, 
Uintah County, Roosevelt City, and Duchesne City, that Hagen 
diminished the reservation, by extinguishing the former exterior 
boundaries of the Reservation for jurisdiction purposes, leaving 
"Indian County" coextensive only with tribal trust lands and current 
trust allotments under 18 U.S.C. Section 1151 (c). The Ute Indian 
Tribe contends that Haosn merely excised from. "Indian country" those 
lands and interests in land that were actually settled under the 
homestead and townsite laws (See pre-trial order, p.4). It is 
significant for the matter here at issue that, subject to it's 
further arguments that the Tribe and it's numbers are not bound by 
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Hagen at all, even the Ute Indian Tribe concedes that Homesteaded 
lands are no longer part of the Ute Indian Reservation and are not 
Indian country. 
Where the United States Supreme Court in Haaen directly 
addressed the diminishment of the Uintah Reservation on the merits, 
that decision is sf.arg decisis in this Court's consideration of the 
jurisdictional issue now before it. 
While the Ute Indian Tribe's current argument that Hagen simply 
excised Homesteaded lands from the Uintah and Ouray Indian 
Reservation, while leaving the original exterior boundaries of the 
Reservation undisturbed is untenable in our view, nevertheless, for 
purposes of this case, it demonstrates that there is no question 
that the Haaen decision held that Homesteaded lands, such as those 
at issue in this case, have been removed from the Uintah and Ouray 
Indian Reservation and "Indian Country" status. 
POINT III: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN HAGEN UNDERSTOOD AND 
INTENDED ROOSEVELT CITY NOT SUBJECT TO INDIAN COUNTRY STATUS 
Toward the conclusion of it's decision in Haaen, the United 
States Supreme Court utilized the jurisdictional history of this 
area to support it's decision that the Uintah and Ouray Indian 
Reservation had been diminished. It specifically cited the 
hardships that otherwise would prevail in the administration of 
state and local governments in areas predominantly non-Indian. In 
connection with this, it specifically referred to the City of 
Roosevelt, Utah, where this criminal episode began (Haaen, at p970) : 
Finally, our conclusion that the statutory language 
and history indicate a congressional intent to diminish is 
not controverted by the subsequent demographics of the 
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Uintah Valley area. We have recognized that, "[w]hen an 
area is predominantly populated by non-Indians with only 
a few surviving pockets of Indian allotments, finding that 
the land remains Indian Country serious burdens the 
administration of state and local governments." S&Lsni, 465 
U.S., at 471-472, n.12, 104 S.Ct., at 1166-1167, n.12. Of 
the original 2 million acres reserved for Indian 
occupation, approximately 400,000 were opened for non-
Indian settlement in 1905. Almost all of the non-Indians 
live on the opened land. The current population of the 
area is approximately 85 percent non-Indian. 1900 Census 
of Population and Housing, Summary Population and Housing 
Characteristics: Utah, 1990 CPH-1-46, Table 17, p.73. The 
population of the largest city in the area--Roosevelt 
City, named for the President who opened the Reservation 
for settlement—is about 93 percent non-Indian. Id., 
Table 3, P.13. Haaen, supra, at P.970. 
CONCLUSION 
The conviction of the defendant, Lynda M. Kozlowicz, of Attempted 
Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, should be sustained. Although the defendant is an 
enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe, this criminal episode took 
place on lands which had been opened for homesteading and were 
removed from "Indian Country" status, as determined by the United 
States Supreme Court in the Hagen case. While litigation continues 
regarding the full effect and extent of the Hagen decision, 
homesteaded land is that category of land most clearly determined by 
Hagen to be free of "Indian Country" status. 
Dated this day of September, 1995 
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DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Herbert Wm. Gillespie 
CERTIFICATE Of MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this day of September, 1995, 
I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, to: 
Lynda M. Kozlowicz 
P.O. Box 472 
Ft. Duchesne, Utah 84026 
/A? kit 7tln J^JLL^. 
erbert Wm. G i l l e s p i e ' 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Information, dated December 12, 1994 
2. Amended Information, date July 14, 1995 
3. Affidavit of Defendant in Advance of No-Contest Plea, dated 
July 14, 1995 
4. Judgement and Order, dated July 17, 1995. 
5. Ute Indian Tribe v State of Utah: Pretrial Order Concerning 
uIndian Country" Issues, dated September 7, 1994 (Ute Tribe's 
request for injunctive relief, pending before Judge Bruce S. 
Jenkins, U.S. District Court for the District of Utah). 
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HERBERT Wm. GILLESPIE, #1191 
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
P. 0. Box 206 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
(801) 738-2435 
0,STK'CT COURT 
OK 1 2 J994 
Duchesne County utan 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH^OOSevelt, Den t 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
LYNDA KOZLOWICZ, 
DOB: 12-11-50 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 2 4 1 < 2 £ £ 3 < 2 > k > 
Judge 
LEA CODE: RPD 
The undersigned County A t t o r n e y , Herber t Wm. 
with the following crimes: 
COUNT 1 
Gillespie, charges the defendant 
(crime) SPEEDING 
(classification) CLASS C MISDEMEANOR 
AT: Duchesne County, State of Utah 
ON OR ABOUT: December 10, 1994 
IN VIOLATION OF: Section 41-6-46 UCA (1953) as amended 
THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTING THE CRIME WERE: 
That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did drive her vehicle upon a 
highway of this state at a speed greater than the maximum speed which is reasonable 
and prudent under existing conditions, to wit: 43 mph in a 30 mph zone. 
COUNT 2 
(crime) FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP 
(classification) THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
AT: Duchesne County, State of Utah, and/or Uintah County, State of Utah 
ON OR ABOUT: December 10, 1994 
IN VIOLATION OF: Section 41-6-13.5 UCA (1953) as amended 
THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTING THE CRIME WERE: 
That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant, an operator of a motor 
vehicle, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to bring 
her vehicle to a stop, operated her vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the 
signal so as to mterfer with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person 
and/or she did attempt to flee or elude the peace officer, by venicle or other 
means. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
Brad Draper 
J.C. Hansen 
DATED this Z day of December, 1994. 
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
HERBERT Wm. GILLESPIE, #1191 
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
P. O. Box 206 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
(801) 738-2435 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
LYNDA KOZLOWICZ, ] 
Defendant ) 
DOB: 12-11-50 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
) Criminal No. 941000326 
I Judge John R. Anderson 
LEA CODE: RPD 
The undersigned County Attorney, Herbert WIIL Gillespie, charges the defendant with the 
following crime: 
(crime) ATTEMPTED FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP 
(classification) CLASS A MISDEMEANOR 
AT: Duchesne County, State of Utah, and/or Uintah County, State of Utah 
ON OR ABOUT: December 10,1994 
IN VIOLATION OF: Sections 41-6-13.5 and 76-4-101 UCA (1953) as amended 
THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTING THE CRIME WERE: 
That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant, an operator of a motor vehicle, having received 
a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to bring her vehicle to a stop, attempted to operate her 
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfer with or endanger the operation 
of any vehicle or person and she did engage in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
attempting to flee or elude the peace officer, by vehicle or other means. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
Brad Draper 
J.C. Hansen 
Peggy Draper 
DATED this /V» day of July, 1995. 
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
HERBERT WM. GILLESPIE #1191 
Duchesne County Attorney 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
(801) 738-2435 ext. 130 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNDA KOZLOWICZ, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
IN ADVANCE OF NO 
CONTEST PLEA 
Criminal No. 9410000326 
Judge John R. Anderson 
I, LYNDA KOZLOWICZ, under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of 
no contest to the following crimes: 
CRIME DEGREE PUNISHMENT 
Count 2 
Attempted Failure to Respond Class A Misdemeanor 1 year in County Jail and/or 
to Officers Signal to Stop $2,500 fine 
I have received a copy of the Amended Information which states the charges against me, I 
have read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offenses to which I am pleading no 
contest 
The elements of the crime with which I am charged are as follows: 
From the amended information: That at Duchesne County, Utah and/or Uintah County, 
Utah, on or about December 10,1994, the defendant, an operator of a motor vehicle 
having received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to bring her vehicle to stop, 
attempted to operate a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere 
with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person and she did engage in conduct 
^{Jj ^ constitutwa'a substantial step toward attempting to flee or elude the peace officer, by 
V* vehicle or other means. 
My conduct, which I am not contesting, which constitutes the elements of the ^ , 
offenses is as follows: - ^ I 
That on December 10,1994, on Highway 40 (200 North), in Roosevelt, Utah, I received a . j * 
visual and an audible signal from a Roosevelt City Police Office to bring my vehicle to a n& 
stop. While I saw and heard the signal to stop, I did not believe that the officer had 
jurisdiction to require me to stop because I am an enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe 
so I continued to drive east on Highway 40. He finally forced me to stop about 1.2 miles 
east of Roosevelt, still on Highway 40 in the general vicinity of the Ballard LDS Church. 
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the following 
facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. 
2. I am appearing pro se, but the Court has appointed attorney Gene Austin to assist 
me in these proceedings. 
3. I have read this affidavit and understand the nature and elements of the charges, 
my rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my plea of no contest 
4. I have had sufficient opportunity to discuss this affidavit, my rights and the 
consequences of my no contest plea with attorney Gene Austin, and others of my choosing. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I also know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to see and hear the 
witnesses against me in open court, in my presence, ard before the judge and jury, with the right 
to cross-examine those witnesses or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know 
that I have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my 
>ehal£ 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do so I 
could not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself. If I do not want to testify, the 
jury will be told no inference adverse to me may be drawn from my failure to testify. 
8- I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not 
guilty" and the Jury Trial already set for July 14,1995, will go forward, at which time the State of 
Utah will have the burden of proving each element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that if I was tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would have 
the right under the Constitution of Utah to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, or where allowed, to the Supreme Court of Utah, and that if I am indigent, the costs 
for such appeal would be paid by the State. 
10. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be imposed upon my plea of no 
contest, and that sentence may be for a jail term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to any 
sentence, an 85% surcharge, required by Utah Law will be imposed. 
11. I know that if I am on probation, parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense 
which I have been convicted or to which I have plead quilty, my plea in the present action may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading no contest I am waiving my constitutional 
rights set out in the preceding paragraphs, except my right to appeal the jurisdiction of the police 
officer to require me to stop, and to arrest me, and the jurisdiction of this Court to pronounce 
judgment upon me. 
13. My plea of no contest is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in this affidavit and in Statement of Stipulated Facts, attached to this affidavit 
14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation 
or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney is not binding on the Judge. I also know that 
any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are also not binding on 
the Court-
15. No threats or coercion of any kind has been made to induce me to plead no 
contest, and no promises, except those contained herein have been made to me. 
16. I know that my plea of no contest, if accepted by the Court, shall have the same 
effect as pleas of guilty, and a sentence may be rendered in the same manner as if a plea of guilty 
had been entered. 
17. I have read this affidavit or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
affidavit I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct 
18. I am satisfied wit the advice and assistance of the attorney the Court appointed to 
assist me in this matter. 
19. lam years of age; I have attended school through the. grade and I 
can read and understand the English language. I am not now and was not under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter my plea of "No Contest" was 
made. I do not suffer from any mental condition which affects my ability to understand what I am 
now doing, or what I was doing when the decision to enter these pleas was made. 
20. I understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea of no contest entered today that I 
must file a written Motion with the Court to do so, within 30 days from today, and the plea may 
only be withdrawn if the Court allows me to withdraw if after I have shown that I have good 
cause to do so. 
21. Knowing all of my rights and having knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights^ 
NC CCfrTE$T 
as set forth above, I do hereby enter my plea of gwity to the charge of: 
v^ > 
°H ± 
Attempted Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal To Stop, a Class A Misdemeanor 
22. That in exchange for Defendant's No Contest plea to the above charge, the State agrees: 
1. To drop the Speeding charge and amend the charge of Failure to Respond to 
Officer's Signal to Stop, a Third Degree Felony, to Attempted Failure to Respond 
to Officer's Signal to Stop, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
2. To recommend to the Court that probation and a suspended jail sentence be 
imposed and to recommend that the fine may be worked off through community 
service (which service the prosecutor will recommend may be performed under the 
direction of Ute Tribe probation authorities). 
23. It is understood and agreed by both parties that the defendant intends to appeal her 
conviction herein on grounds of no jurisdiction, pursuant to the attached Statement of Stipulated 
Facts, and to that extent this is a conditional plea. 
DATED this 1 ^  day oi^A^yjx/{ . )995. 
^ 
APPROVED: 
XHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY ? 
JL ^ £ ^ 
ATTORNEY APPOINTED TO ASSIST 
THE DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF STIPULATED FACTS 
The parties, for purposes of appeal, agree and stipulate to the following facts in addition 
to the statement of defendant's conduct set forth in the Affidavit 
1. Defendant is an enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation. 
2, Defendant was required to stop and arrested by a Roosevelt City Police Officer 
pursuant to State authority. 
3- All relevant conduct occurred on Highway 40 (200 North Street) within Roosevelt 
City and continued on or along Highway 40, ending about 1.2 miles east of Roosevelt, just west 
of the Ballard LDS Church. 
\j 4. Said area of occurrence croccec no lando hold in truot for Indiana or the Ute Indian 
^ Tribe by tho Unitoo State** W A&ncsrsfpeP L#Q>S "» "/rH/AJ' ^6H^Y Efc*f£»T \ \ 
5. Said area of occurrence is within the area encompassed by what the 10th Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah. 773F.2d 1087 (1985)(en banc), 
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994(1986) had determined to be the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and 
Ouray Indian Reservation. 
:V 
)A KOZLOWICZ 1 HERBERT 
DEFENDANT DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
WM. GILLESPIE 
GENE AUSTIN 
ATTORNEY APPOINTED TO ASSIST 
DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECIiTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Linda Kozlowicz, 
Defendant I have reviewed this affidavit of the defendant and find that the declaration of the 
elements of the offense charged and the Statement of the defendant's conduct appears to be true 
and correct No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered 
defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained in the affidavit or as supplemented on record 
before the Court There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest 
HERBERT WM. GILLESPIE X 
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY. 
I certify that I am the attorney appointed by the Court to assist the defendant above, and 
that I know she has read the affidavit or that I have read it to her and I have discussed it with her 
and believe that she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly 
stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in 
the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
Attorney appointed by the Court to assist 
the defendant 
JC^—£^^ 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing affidavit and certification, the Court finds 
the defendant's plea of NO CONTEST is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the 
defendant's plea of NO CONTEST to the charge set forth in the affidavit be accepted and 
entered. 
DATED this i± . day of , 1995. 
District Court Judge 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
HERBERT WM. GILLESPIE #1191 
Duchesne County Attorney 
Box 206 
Duchesne, Utah 84066 
801-738-2435 ext. 130 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
LYNDA KOZLOWICZ, ] 
Defendant ] 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
) Case No. 941000326 
1 Judge John R. Anderson 
This matter came on again before this Court for trial by jury on Friday, 
July 14, 1995. The State was represented by Herbert Wm. Gillespie, Duchesne 
County Attorney. The defendant, Lynda Kozlowicz, was present, representing 
herself pro se, and also present was Eugene C. Austin, attorney appointed by the 
Court to assist the defendant in this matter. 
The Court was informed that an agreement had been arrived at between the 
parties, pursuant to which the defendant would enter her plea of No Contest to 
the reduced charge of Attempted Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, and the additional charge of Speeding would be dismissed. 
The Court received, accepted and approved the Affidavit of Defendant in 
Advance of No Contest Plea, and accepted the Defendant's Plea of No Contest, 
reserving her right to appeal the jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to the 
agreement of the parties. 
NOW THEREFORE, BASED on the statements of Counsel and the Defendant and the 
file and record herein, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
Defendant is sentenced to serve and be confined three (3) months in the 
Duchesne County Jail, and to pay a fine in the sum of $750.00. Said jail shall 
be suspended upon payment of the fine. Defendant may discharge the fine by 
performing community service. Defendant may do community serve under the 
direction of the Ute Tribe probation authorities, or other appointed authorities 
of the Tribe. 
Community service shall be completed, and proof of such completion shall 
be provided to this Court within 90 days. 
Until community service is completed defendant shall be on informal 
probation to this Court with the conditions that she violate no laws. 
DATED this /7 day of July, 1995. 
BY ORT 
'AAA 
Judge John R. Anderson 
EUGEWI3 AUSTIN, Attorney appointed 
by the Court to assist defendant 
'Pid fc 
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XI THE UKITED STATES D l S T R f i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
FOR THE. DISTRICT OP UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
AW If AM 
UTE IND1AM TRIBE of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation/ Utah, 
P l a i n t i f f
 r 
v . 
STATS OT UTAH, 
Defendant-in-Intervention, 
and, 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a p o l i t i c a l 
subdiv i s ion of the Stats of Utah 
UINTAH COUNTY, a p o l i t i c a l 
Subdivision of the Stat a of Utah 
corporation; and DUCHESNE CITY; 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendants, 
UNITED STATES OF AKERICA, 
Amicus Curiae. 
^J^strnm,^ 
Civil No. C-75-408J 
PRETRIAL ORDER CONCERNING 
•IKJIJtH COOHtBT- ISSUES 
This matter carna before the court on August 2, 1994, at a 
pretrial conference held before the Honorable Srttce S- Jenkins, 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ* p. 16• Robert 3. Thompson III anpearfcd 
ae counsel for plaintiff Ute Indian Tribe. Xichael M. Quealy and 
John W* Andrews, Assistant Utah Attorneys General, appeared ae 
counsel for defendant State of Utah. Craig H, Bunnell appeared 
ae counsel fox defendant Roosevelt City. Roland Ureak appeared 
as counsel for defendant Duchesne City. Herbert Wnu Gillespie 
appeared as counsel for defendant Duchesne county, jaann B* 
Stringham appeared as counsel for defendant Uintah County-
(Defendants State of Utahf Roosevelt City, Duchesno City, 
Duchesne County and Uintah County are referred to collectively 
herein as "the state and Local Defendants") « 
The following action was taken z 
1. JimiSDICTIQN AHP VEHT72, This is an action brought by 
an Indian tribe in which the matter in controversy arises under 
the laws o£ the United States. Jurisdiction of the court is 
invoked under 28 U.S.C. S 1362. The jurisdiction of the court is 
not disputed and is hereby determined to be present. Venue was 
determined by the court to be proper pursuant to 28 y.s.C. S 
1391(b)- Venue is laid in the Central Division of the District 
of Utah- See 28 U.S,C« S 125* 
2 . ^SNKRMi JtATORg Q9 THE ^lAIMS OF THE PARTIES. 
A. Introduction. This Pre-trial Order is submitted 
by the parties in accordance with the Court's order in open court 
on August 2, 1994. The purpose of this Pre-Tri&l Order is to set 
forth the issues remaining to be decided by the Court in this 
action after the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Haaen v. Utah, 114 S* Ct. 9SB (1S94). 
This action waa originally sed by plaintiff Ute Indian 
Tribe (tha "Ute Tribe" or the "Tribe') "seeking decieratcry and 
injunctive relief establishing the exterior boundaries of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, defining the force and effect of 
the Tribe's Law and Order Code within those boundaries, and 
restraining the defendants froa interfering with the enforcement 
of that Code-" Ufca Indian Tribe v, Stare of Utah. 521 F.Supp-
2 
1072, 1075 (D. Utah 1981). in 1985, the united StateB Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that, with two limited 
exceptions not now relevant, the original exterior boundaries of 
the Uintah Reservation and the related Unconpahgre Reservation 
remained unchanged for jurisdictional purposes, nte Indian Tribe 
v. State of Utah, 773 P. 2d 1087 (10th Clr. 1385), cert, dan-
479 U.S. 994 (1986). 
In 1992, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in two related 
criminal cases that the original boundaries of the Reservation 
had bean diminished when Congress opened the reservation to ncn-
Indian settlement in the early 1900e. State v. Haaen. 858 P. 2d 
925 (Utah 1992); State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992). As a 
consequence, the Court held that the State had properly asserted 
criminal jurisdiction over the Indian defendants because the 
locua of their crimes, although within the original exterior 
boundaries of the reservation, was outside "Indian Country" as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. $ 1151. 
The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari 
to roaolve the direct conflict between the decision of the Tenth 
Circuit in Ute Indian Tribe and of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Haaun and peraric. In Haaen v. Utah., ___ U.S. , 114 S.Ct. Si3 
(1994), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision, holding that the Uintah Indian Reservation had been 
diminished by Congress. 
The principal issue now before the Court is the scope of the 
Supremo Court's decisicr.. AS ttora fully set torzh below, the 
3 
Tribe contends that Haoan merely excised from *Indian Country" 
those lands and interests in land that were actually settled 
under the homestead and towneite laws. The Tribe contends that 
all other lands or interests held in fee or trust status remain 
subject to tribal and federal jurisdiction* Conversely, the 
State and Local Defendants contend that the diminishment; of the 
reservation extinguished the former exterior boundaries of the 
Reservation for jurisdictional purposes, leaving "Indian Country1' 
coextenaive only with tribal trust lands and current trust 
allotments under 18 p.5«c. s 1151(c). 
B. Plaintiff's Claimst The State seeks to bind the 
Tribe and Its members by a decision rendered in an action in 
which the Tribe and its members were not permitted to participate 
as a party. Howeverr the State's efforts must fail because ths 
rules of preclusion do not extend to non-parties. Therefore/ 
with respect to the Tribe and its members, the State's 
jurisdiction is liaited by the Tenth Circuit's decision in ute 
Indian Tribe y, Titah. in that case, the federal courts held that 
the State had no jurisdiction over the Tribe and its members 
throughout the original boundaries of the Uintah Valley 
Reservation. 
In pagan v, Utah, the Utah and United States Supreme Courts 
held that, through a series of enactments between 1902-05, 
Congress intended to restore to State jurisdiction lands on the 
Uintah valley Reservation that were settled under the homestead 
ar townsite laws. Neither Court addressed the jurisdictional 
4 
status of other non-trust lands (or interests in land) on the 
Reservation. 
There are thousands of acres on the Reservation that passed 
from trust to non-trust status other than by having been 
hcmeateaded or tovmsited pursuant to the 1302-05 Acts. Those 
lands include acreage that was apportioned to the •Mixed-Blood" 
Utes under the Ute Partition Act; lands allotted to individual 
Indians; former trust lands that: were exchanged by the Tribe for 
then-fee (now trust) lands in an effort to consolidate its iand-
holdings; and the mineral estate of homeateaded lands that were 
restored to tribal ownership in the 1940'B.1 Although it cites 
to no law (other than Hacer.. which did not address the disputed 
lands) for tho proposition that the non-homesteaded and non-
townsited non-trust lands were removed from "Indian country," the 
State urges that all of those lands have been separated from th© 
Reservation and are now subject to Stata jurisdiction. The 
defendants' argument ignores long-settled lav that once Congress 
has established a reservation, all lands within it remain a pari 
of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress. B.a.» 
United States v. ^Leerine, 215 U.S. 273, 285, 30 S.Ct. 93, 94 
(1909). 
1
 If, as the State asserts, the effect of Haaen was to re-
draw the Reservation boundaries, then the decision only re-draws 
the boundaries as of the opening of tho Reservation in 1905. All 
of the categories of land which the Tribe asserts remain "Indian 
country" were within the boundaries of the "re-drawn" 1905 
Reservation or were restored to the Tribe's beneficial ownersr.is 
in 1945. 
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Consistent with Ceiegtlne, the Tribe asserts that the 
thousands of acws of tribal lands that passed, into non-trust 
status other than through the 1905 opening of the Reservation 
remain "Indian country." Neither the Utah nor the Doited States 
Supreme Court addressed the jurisdictional status of those lands 
and, thus, Hacrefi can not be road as contradicting the Tribe's 
position. Those lands remain part of the Reservation, subject to 
tribal and federal jurisdiction* 
In addition, some of the lands that were generally, but not 
specifically, addressed by the Supreme Court in Haaen remain 
"Indian Country,** Of the three townsites established under the 
1905 Act (Duchesne, Myton and Ser.dlett), at least two may qualify 
as 'dependent Indian Communities *" See 18 U#S*C« S 1151(c)» The 
lands for which no patents were issued {e.g., streets, alleys and 
common areas) within the towisites that do not qualify as 
"dependent Indian communities* regained their * Indian country11 
status when they were restored to the Tribe's beneficial 
ownership in the 1940's,2 
The State attempts to bootstrap the jurisdictional status of 
the National Forest and Uncompahrre Reservations into this 
1
 The State mischaracterizes the Tribe's claims as a title 
dispute. That is not the case. Title to the disputed lands is 
not in question* Rather, the only issue with respect to those 
lands is whether there is a::y decision - other than the ones 
rendered in this action - affecting the "Indian country" (i.«-f 
jurisdictional) status of those lands. 
5 
action- However, that issue was finally resolved oy the Tenth 
Circuit in 1985 and is not properly before this Court J 
The Tribe contends that the conduct of the State during the 
past 14 years demonstrates, more than any words could, the 
necessity for a permanent order enjoining the State from 
interfering in the Tribe'* and federal government'e jurisdiction 
on the disputed fee lands, Thia Court denied the Tribe's request 
for a permanent injunction in 1980, based in part upon the 
assurances it received frcsn the State that It would adhere to the 
Court's decision. Yet, before the ink was dry on the Tenth 
Circuit's final decision in this case, the State began 
prosecuting persons whom it argued were Indian for criminal 
conduct occurring within the area that thia Court and the Ten^h 
Circuit had confirmed was "Indian country•" While condoning this 
Court's decision that the Uintah Reservation remained intact, 
the Stata was wilfully violating federal law, in conscious 
disregard of this Court's admonition in 1980 that a failure of 
the Stars* to adhera to the Court's d eerie ion would be blatant 
interference with tribal sovereignty. What, other than a direct 
3
 The Supreme Court of the United States denied the State 
and Local defendants' motion to review the Tenth Circuit's 
decision with respect to the National Forest and Dncompahgre 
Reservation lands in 1986. The state affirmatively stated that 
the status of those lands were not before the Supreme Court in 
Hacren. See Brief of Respondent State of Utah at 3, n.l, Hacen v. 
Ptah. No, 92-6281, 114 $,Ct. 958 (1954). 
4
 $£& Brief of Appellee State of Utah at 2-3, Ute Indian 
Tribe v. Utah. 773 ?.2d 1087 (Nos. 81-1827 & 81-1901)
 r CBTZ. 
denied 479 U.S. 994 (1985). 
7 
order from this Court, will stop the State from repeating in 1994 
conduct thar it deliberately undertook in 198S? What, other a 
direct order from this Court, will parmad* the State that it is 
obligated to follow*federal law with respect to its Indian 
citizens? 
C. Defendants' Clalnflg The Ute Tribe'* initial 
procedural claim that it is not bound by the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Hacen ia incorrect:* The Supreme Court has addressed 
the diminishmant of the Uintah Reservation directly and on the 
merits* That decision is stare decisis in the Court's 
consideration of the issues now before it, without reference to 
the Tribe's participation, Nor are the State and Local 
Defendants collaterally estopped by the Tenth Circuit's now 
discredited decision on boundary issues in the Ute Tribe case. 
Where the substantive law governing an issue has changedf as it 
obviously has here, collateral estoppel is inapplicable to bar 
relitigation of the issue. 
The primary substantive issue before the Court is whether 
three classes of non-trust fee lands remain "Indian Country* 
under IB U«3,C, S 1151 after the U.S. Surrame Court's dacisisn lr. 
Hagen. The State and Local Defendants believe that Hacen clearly 
established that the original exterior boundaries of the Uin'cah 
Valley Reservation were extinguished by Congress, leaving tribal 
jurisdiction coextensive with tribal and allotted trust lands. 
Cvery relevant case dealing with the aftermath of reservation 
lis establishment has expressly cr impliedly found that lands 
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within the diminished area of a reservation lose their " Indian 
Country- status unless actually held in trust. That is the case 
here. 
The Tribe's argument that Eacen simply "excisedn homeateaded 
lands from the Uintah & Ouray reservation, while leaving the 
original exterior boundaries of the reservation otherwise 
undisturbed, directly conflicts with the position of the Tribe in 
its pleadings filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in Haaen, as well 
as in this court. Horeoverf the Tribe's position that 
diminishment of the reservation could somehow take place without 
affecting the original exterior boundaries of the reservation 
contradicts the Supreme Court's recent reservation 
disestablishment casas, as well as the directly analogous 
decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Plttsbury i 
Midway Coal Co. v. Yazzie. 203 F- 2d 13B7 (10th Cir, 1990). 
The Uta Tribe's additional claims to beneficial ownership ox 
carrain subsurface minerals and townsite common areas, and to 
jurisdiction over areas claimed to be dependent Indian 
communitiesr are not properly before the Court, This action was 
brought, by the Tribe to detorroine the exterior jurisdictional 
boundaries of the TJintah fc Ouray reservation. The new claims are 
inherently factual, and aro not found in either the complaint or 
original pre-trial order in this case. They should be addressed 
in a separate action. 
The State and Loc&l Defendants also disagree with the Uta 
Tribe's claims that the jurisdictional status of the Taras-
9 
ReserveM landa and the forxaer Uncoiapahgre Reservation remains 
undisputed after Haaen* Although Hacan did not expressly deal 
with these areas, it and other appellate decisions since Ut£ 
Indian Tribe (and the filings of jH&ifiBft United States) hava 
disavowed the legal analysis contained in Ute Indian Tribe 
concerning the forest lands and uncorapahgre. Becauee the law 
governing whether these areas ware removed from reservation 
scar us has changed, the State and Local Defendants are not 
collaterally estopped from raising this issuef whether now or in 
the future• 
Finally, the State and Local Defendants strongly contest 
that the injunctive relief sought by the Tribe is justified or 
necassary, particularly in the broad'and ambiguous form 
requested• The Tribe has not presented any evidence ex argument 
that its Interest* would be harmed should the injunction be 
lifted*5 An ambiguous injunction precluding the State from 
"inrarf©rence" with tribal jurisdiction over the disputed fee 
lands here would have an undue chilling effect on valid exercises 
of state authority on non-truet lands. 
3- TfflqONTRHVBRTED FAC?S, The following ffltcta are 
established by adirdseiona in the pleadings, by order pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. F* 56{d)# or by Htipulation of counsel; 
5
 The State disputes the Tribe's clains that it somehow 
acted in bad faith to prosecute Tribal cambers after the Tenth 
Circuit decision* It notes that Clinton Perank wae charged prior 
to the Tenth Circuit's efl franc decision was rendered, while tha 
original Tenth Circuit decision upholaing the State's position 
was still in effect. 
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A. In ana Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 
(10th CIr. 1985), cert:, den. 479 DNS. 994 ri986HwUte Indian 
l£iM")# the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
held that the Uintah* valley Reservation had not been diminished 
by CongxesB pursuant to the Act of May 27
 f 1902, ch. 888, 32 
Stat. 263 (the "1902 Act") and the Act of March 3, 1905, ch* 
1479, 33 Stat. 1069 (the -1S05 Act*)* 
B« In 3tata v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1952)f"ftyrank"1, 
the Utah Supremo Court held that the Uintah Reservation had been 
diminished by the 1902 Act, as amended. The Utah Suprwne Conn: 
further held that: &yt:on, Utah, althcugh within the original 
exterior boundaries of the Uintah Reservation, was not within 
"Indian Country" as defined in 18 U.'3«C, S 1151. 
C. In State v. Hacen, 858 P. 2d 925 (Utah 1992), a 
companion caae to P*rarJ*, the Utah Supreme Court summarily 
affirmed the State's prosecution of an rndian defendant for 
conduct occurring in ttyton, Utah, on the basis of its decision in 
yerank. 
D. On July 31/ 1992, after the Utah Supreme Court's slip 
opinions were released in ffaaen snd ?»rsn> , the Ute Tribe filrd i 
renewed motion in these proceedings pursuant to a claimed 
exception to the Anti-Injunction ACT to permanently enjoin the 
Utah Supreme Court from entering as final its decision in those 
casesf and to enjoin ths State and its political subdivisions 
from enforcing or relying upon those decisions. The Triie 
simultaneously sought a temporary restraining order or 
preliminary Injunction having the same effect« 
E. On August 31, 1992f the State and Local Defendants and 
the Ute Tribe, through counsel, entered into a stipulation for 
the entry of injunctive relief in this action pending the 
decision of the court on the Zzo Tribe's action for permanent 
injunctive relief* The stipulation by its terms expiree on the 
date after the Court issues its decision on the Tribe's motion 
for injunctive relief. 
?• The Court issued an order incorporating the parties7 
Stipulation concerning injunctive relief on September 3f 1992, 
nujic pro tunc August 2, 1992• 
G* In April, 1993f the United States Supreme Court granted 
a petition for writ of certiorari to resolve the direct conflict 
between the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in JJte 
Indian fo?tlsft and th« decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in Hacen 
and £££&&• 
H, On ite swn motionr ?n April 28, 1993, this Court 
vacated the scheduled hearing on the Ute Tribe's motion for 
injunctive relief pending actim by the Supreme Court. 
I, On February 23, 1993f in ffatyen v. Utah, t —_ U.S. , 
114 S. Ct. 958 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision, holding that the Uintah Indian 
Reservation had been diminished by Congress pursuant to the 19 02 
Act. 
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J. On April 25/ 1994, the State and Local Defendants filed 
a motion to vacate and set aside the stipulated injunction, and 
to dismiss the ute Tribe's motion for permanent injunctive 
relief. 
X. On May 2, 1994, the Court temporarily modified the 
stipulated injunction to permit the State and I>ocal Defendants to 
prosecute felony crimes occurring on land! within the original 
boundaries of the Uintah Valley Reservation which are not "Indian 
Country" as defined by 18 U.5.C. § 1151, e£ $§&, The Court's 
modification was without prejudice to the claims of the parties, 
and did not determine the 'Indian Country** status of particular 
lands. At the hearing in this case on August 2, 1994, the Ccurt 
clarified that the injunction also did not extend to prosecution 
of misdemeanor crimes occurring outside of "Indian Countrv." 
L. Lands within the original Uintah Valley Reservation 
that were entered and settled under federal homestead, cash entry 
and townaite laws are not 'Indian Country", as that term ie 
defined in 18 g.s.g. s 1151. This fact is subject to the 
contention o£ the Tribe that the State and Local Defendants ara 
collaterally estc-rped from assorting che ^on-Indian Country 
status of these lands, vis-a-vis the Tribe and its aembera± by 
vi=r-ae of the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Tifca Indian Tribe. 
H. Lands within the original Uintah Valley Reservation, 
title to which is currently held in trust by the United States 
for the benefit of the Tribe or an individual Indian, are »Indian 
Country" for jurisdictional purposes. 
4 . MIXED ISSUES OF FACT AMp LAW. The f o l l o w i n g i s & u e s 
involve both factual and legal determinations*: 
A. Tf the issue is properly before the Courtr are certain 
communities within the original reservation boundaries dependent 
Indian communities as Bet forth in 18 tJ.S.fi, S 1151(b)? 
B. If the issue is properly before the Court, were the 
streets, alleys and other public places in the town si tea of 
Duchesne, Myton, or Randlett restored to beneficial ownership of 
the Tribe pursuant to the 1945 Restoration Order? 
C. If the issue is properly before the Court, were the 
mineral estates of those homesteads, to which the mineral 
interest was not patented, restored to beneficial ownership of 
the Tribe pursuant to the 1945 Restoration Order? 
5. COKTBSTED ISSTTKS OF TAW. The contested issues of law, 
in addition to those implicit in the foregoing mixed issues of 
fact and law, are2 
A. In spite of Haaen. are the State and Local Defendants 
precluded as a matzar of law or equity under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel or otherwise, frcir. asserting jurisdiction 
over the Tribe or its members within the exterior boundaries of 
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, as those boundaries were 
defined in Ute Indian Tribe v. State cJ Utah. 773 F.2d 1087 (10th 
Cir. 1985), cart. d§n. 479 U.S. 994 (1986)? 
•4 
B - II I l 11 1111II i i  I inI in 11 .111l"i i ' ' rr t 'i i 11 i i r f i III'11 ill I! m i I I' II f I "I u \ "1 fl« v e 
to in te rvene ae a party Ul Haaen, 1B the Supreme Court""! ducisi.vn 
b lndlnq on the Tribe srd i t-s members In t h i s a c t i on under the 
doc-i i 11 I i i I jjtaro deciaxa n i < 11 I «i 11 i. m m in i 
In 11 uilii o£ Haaen, do any ^ *" f -,he £oJ los ing 
c a t e g o r i e s of fee land c o n s t i t u t e "Indian Country" under 
U«a.ll. | i lbJ i I ii| I  in ih I rliHi- was apportionec 
Utas under t he Ute p a r t i t i o n Act- ((b) landa a l l o t t e d to 
I n M . l v l i i r . B 1 111i.l I  I ' I I I M I' I n I III JI i i i i i I illI I I  M M i l l I'M n u n I'll I I H I I 'I "I" 
iti'nl ('ti lands that were heid In ".rust a l t e i tli« Reeerva tJ in mui 
opened In 190^ but tha t einco navo boen exchanged i n t o £e*'i S ta t ;s 
III i1 I I I I I V II I n I Il ' llHIIII I Hi 11" in III * ' R l l l i j k l " 1 111 l i l t / MT I I 
c o n s o l i d a t e I In land-hold inga . 
H In the lit f-t Tnbp e n t i t l e d to in junc t i ve r e l i e f aga ins t 
S t a t e "i in I ii'H Lie Lend ant.«:, ML J i io ( ul th in WITUJIIL gi* jiu^'i 
and sub jec t -ma t t e r llmltaticmEi' 
E Ii i 'i l.liu nriii ri I \u i ;lii1nii ivmcer.'sirig dependent Indian 
communities , subsurfacu minera-a , *ind tow ' mi t r e a t s ana pus.'. o 
p l a c e s properly bnfore the Court, in th ia act ion? 
F H i in i I I I 11 MI i i in I J i M rtiiilLi i*! a I nut :nn i u "i 
t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l s t a t u s it the National Forest Lands and 
Urtcompahgre Reservation proper ly before the Court In th la action.1 
Mn MI I riii In l m i 1 nn Yum 1 n I i I i i jht I | iJiU£i?1 
ESHIBnff. Because the iudUbki tu be determined by the 
Court at the hearing scheduled fcr japtomcar L2f 1394 a r s iega~ 
1,
 l in «-,i mi 11.'" rjl im i i l f l " i n r i f l u ; ' 1 ! ! , , ! i M ' / H V I J ^ O I . H J n : r .s 
parties at this time. The pleadings, exhibits and briefa 
submitted in this case, together with the pleadings, exhibits, 
briefs and record* in Ferank and Hagen, may be considered part of 
the record in this action. The Tribe intends to submit 19S4 and 
1948 Opinions of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, 
concerning the effect, respectively, of the Haaen decision and 
the 1945 Restoration Order on the Tribe's jurisdiction. Should 
the Court determine to hear the mixed issues of fact and law eat 
forth above at a later date, this pre-trial order will be 
supplemented if additional exhibits are required. 
7. WITHESSRS* Because the issue* to be determined by the 
Court at the hearing scheduled fcr September 12, 1994 are legal 
in nature, no witnesses will be called by the parties at that 
hearing. Should the Court determine to hear the mixed issues of 
fact and law set forth above at a later datef this pre-trial 
order will be supplemented. 
8. RBOTOTg ?PK immWXm- "one* 
9* AMENDMENTS TO PL2ADIHG". There ware no requests to 
amend pleadings. 
10, DlSCOVT!V.T< If necassar-j, a discovery schedule fc*r th* 
factual issues set forth above will be set by the Court at a 
future date. 
11- TRIAL SITTING. The Court will hear legal arguments 
concerning the issues set forth in Paragraph 5 above on September 
12, 1994, 
12. POSSIBILITY OF SETTX^ TflgWT. Poss ib i l i ty of Battlament 
i» considered f a i r . 
BY THE COURT; 
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